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Abstract 
Few questions in psychology are as fundamental or as elusive as the sense of one’s own body. 
Despite widespread recognition of the link between body and self, psychology has only recently 
developed methods for the scientific study of bodily awareness. Experimental manipulations of 
embodiment in healthy volunteers have allowed important advances in knowledge. Synchronous 
multisensory inputs from different modalities play a fundamental role in producing ‘body 
ownership’, the feeling that my body is ‘mine’. Indeed, appropriate multisensory stimulation can 
induce ownership over external objects, virtual avatars, and even other people’s bodies. We 
argue that bodily experience is not monolithic, but has measurable internal structure and 
components that can be identified psychometrically and psychophysically, suggesting the 
apparent phenomenal unity of self-consciousness may be illusory. We further review evidence 
that the sense of one’s own body is highly plastic, with representations of body structure and size 
particularly prone to multisensory influences. 
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 “Everyone”, William James (1890) famously asserted, “knows what attention is.” The 
same is true of the experience of embodiment: everyone knows what it’s like to have a body. Our 
body is ubiquitous in our perceptual experience and is the most familiar object we encounter. 
The ubiquity of this experience, however, has not translated into clarity or agreement about its 
fundamental nature. On the contrary, research on bodily awareness has historically been plagued 
by disagreement, confusion, and inconsistent terminology. Despite these continuing difficulties, 
recent investigations have shed new light on bodily awareness, providing rich insight into this 
fundamental underpinning of psychological life. 
 The central difficulty in any empirical study of bodily awareness is the control condition. 
An ideal experimental investigation would compare two conditions, one in which the participant 
has a body, and another in which they do not. Obviously, such ‘brain in a vat’ studies are 
restricted to thought experiments, since the crucial control condition in which the body is absent 
is impossible to realise. The body, in James’s (1890) memorable phrase, is “always there.” 
Recent progress has resulted from development of novel methods for circumventing this 
dilemma and allowing experimental manipulation of bodily awareness and of our conscious 
model of our body (the body image), including perceptual techniques, such as the rubber hand 
illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), and emerging technologies such as virtual reality (VR; 
Slater et al., 2009) in which the usual physical laws affecting our bodies can be altered. 
 In the rubber hand illusion (Figure 1), a prosthetic hand touched synchronously with 
one’s own unseen hand produces the compelling feeling that the rubber hand actually is one’s 
hand. In contrast, following asynchronous touch no such experience arises. Thus, comparing 
these conditions provides an elegant experimental manipulation of embodiment. Using VR, the 
illusion has recently been extended to the whole body (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). Such 
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techniques have transformed research on bodily awareness allowing researchers to begin 
systematically investigating human embodiment. We review recent research investigating the 
fundamental structure of bodily awareness, and show how specific components of bodily 
awareness are influenced by various experimental manipulations. 
 
Components of Bodily Awareness 
 Is embodiment a single, monolithic experience? At first sight, the phenomenal unity of 
self-consciousness suggests that it is: we experience a single coherent conscious self, 
continuously linked to our body. However, recent evidence converges on the interpretation that 
bodily awareness is a rich, complex experience which can be decomposed into distinct and 
dissociable components, with important functional differences. Clearly, these elements cannot 
simply be the different parts of the body: the experiences that I have of my left leg are similar to 
those of my right leg. Rather, the constituent elements of bodily awareness are the different 
feelings, beliefs, and attitudes one has towards one’s body.  
 
Psychometric Decomposition of Subjective Reports 
Another approach to decomposing bodily awareness emphasises measurement of 
psychometric dependent variables, rather than experimental manipulation of independent 
variables. While many rubber hand studies use questionnaires assessing subjective experiences 
(e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), recent studies have employed formal methods to systematically 
reveal the characteristic structure of bodily awareness. For example, we (Longo et al., 2008a, 
2008b, 2009) used the rubber hand illusion to combine experimental manipulation of 
embodiment with psychometric decomposition of structured questionnaire data using principal 
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components analysis. In a large sample of 131 participants, we identified four distinct 
components of bodily awareness during both synchronous and asynchronous visuo-tactile 
stimulation. These were termed embodiment of rubber hand, loss of own hand, movement, and 
affect (Longo et al., 2008a). Further analysis of the embodiment of rubber hand component 
revealed that in both conditions it could be further decomposed into three subcomponents we 
termed, ownership, agency, and location. The synchronous and asynchronous stimulation 
conditions differed in terms of how strongly each component was present or absent, confirming 
that this manipulation succeeds in manipulating bodily awareness. Nevertheless, the common set 
of components suggests a shared underlying structure to both experiences. A further component, 
deafference, emerged only following asynchronous stimulation, indicating that experiences of 
embodiment may differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively. 
 
Stimulation of Distinct Sensory-Motor Pathways 
One method for decomposing bodily awareness is to induce bodily illusions by 
stimulating different sensory and motor pathways. This method has been used to investigate 
perhaps the most salient distinction between aspects of bodily awareness, between the sense of 
ownership over the body, the feeling that my body is my own, and the sense of agency, the 
feeling that I am in control of my body and its actions. Tsakiris and colleagues (2006) showed 
participants a video image of their hand, displayed in real-time or delayed, while their finger 
moved either actively or passively. In the passive condition, their finger was lifted by a thread, 
like a marionette, producing a purely sensory match between proprioception and vision. In the 
active condition, participants moved the finger themselves, adding a motor command to visual 
and proprioceptive feedback. Subjective reports in the passive condition confirmed that 
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participants felt like they were looking directly at their own hand, but did not feel that they had 
control over the hand: an experience of ownership without agency. In the active condition, in 
contrast, participants reported clear experiences of both ownership and agency (Longo & 
Haggard, 2009; Tsakiris, Longo, & Haggard, 2010). 
 Such results provide empirical support for the dissociability of ownership and agency, 
previously distinguished on purely conceptual grounds. Agency and ownership have also been 
found to have different functional consequences on proprioception (Tsakiris et al., 2006; 
Kammers et al., 2009b) and manual reaction time (Longo & Haggard, 2009). Further, 
neuroimaging studies have identified largely independent brain networks underlying these 
experiences. Ownership has been linked to the insula, frontal operculum, and cortical midline 
areas (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris et al., 2007, 2010), agency to motor preparatory areas and 
the inferior parietal lobe (Nahab et al., 2011; Tsakiris et al., 2010). 
 These results reveal that bodily awareness has measureable structure and can be 
decomposed into dissociable components. At one level, this suggests that the apparent 
phenomenal unity of bodily awareness, linking the body to a single “I”, is illusory. However, 
these individual elements could form holistic Gestalts, experienced as distinct from the sum of 
their parts. Understanding the processes producing such Gestalts is an interesting topic for future 
research. While illusions such as the rubber hand may not reflect the full diversity of 
embodiment, they nevertheless provide a valuable model case. In this sense they may be to 
bodily awareness what the fruit fly is to genetics. 
 
Plasticity of Embodiment 
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 Our bodily form is generally stable from moment to moment. Changes in physical body 
structure nevertheless do occur, both during development, and due to diet, exercise, or trauma. 
Veridical body representation thus requires some degree of plasticity, so that changes in actual 
body form are mirrored by corresponding changes in both the brain’s maps of somatosensory 
inputs, and also in the conscious body image. Understanding how such plasticity arises and, is 
important both for understanding normal development, and also for understanding pathological 
distortions of body image in conditions such as eating disorders (Eshkevari et al., in press). 
Recent studies have found striking evidence for remarkably rapid and profound plasticity of 
bodily representation. 
 
Measuring Bodily Plasticity 
Gandevia and Phegan (1999) measured the perceived size of body parts by having 
participants select from an array of body part pictures, the one most closely matching their own 
body part. Cutting off sensory signals using local anaesthesia led to an increase in perceived 
body part size. This phenomenon will be familiar to many of those who have experienced dental 
anaesthesia, in which the mouth and teeth often feel swollen, a result experimentally confirmed 
by having participants match their own tooth size from arrays of tooth images (Türker, Yeo, & 
Gandevia, 2005). Intriguingly, anaesthesia of the thumb also produced a smaller increase in 
perceived lip size (Gandevia & Phegan, 1999). While the thumb and lips are not adjacent on the 
actual body, they are adjacent in maps of the body in somatosensory cortex (the ‘Penfield 
homunculus’), suggesting that body image changes may result from plasticity in somatosensory 
cortex. 
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Studies using postural illusions further suggest that conflict between sensory signals can 
also induce plastic change in body representation. In the ‘Pinocchio illusion’ (Figure 2), illusory 
arm movement is generated by vibrating muscle tendons, which generates signals specifying 
muscle lengthening, though no actual muscular change occurs, causing postural illusions. Thus, 
vibrating the biceps tendon produces illusions of forearm extension, while vibrating the triceps 
tendon produces illusions of forearm flexion. But what if the hand perceived as moving is 
touching another body part, such as the nose? For the forearm to be moving away from the face 
while maintaining contact with the nose, the nose would have to be growing. Dramatically, many 
participants do indeed report feeling that their nose is getting longer (Lackner, 1988)! Similarly, 
by placing hands on one’s hips, illusions of one’s waist becoming fatter or thinner can be 
produced (Ehrsson et al., 2005), as can illusions of individual fingers shortening or lengthening 
(de Vignemont, Ehrsson, & Haggard, 2005). In these situations, immediate proprioceptive input 
requires an adjustment in body representation to resolve an apparent conflict. Recently, we 
showed that plasticity occurs as a result of such conflict, even when the altered percept does not 
directly resolve the conflict (Longo et al., 2009a). We vibrated tendons of antagonistic muscles 
(biceps and triceps) simultaneously. In this case, the brain receives contradictory signals 
indicating that the arm is flexing and simultaneously extending. Such proprioceptive conflict 
produces perceived arm contraction, as if lack of coherent sense of body location leads body 
representation to shrink inwards on itself. While we experience our body as a stable object with 
spatio-temporal continuity from one moment to the next, our experience of what our body is like 
is, to a large degree, constructed on the basis of the real-time signals continuously reaching the 
brain from throughout the body. 
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The rubber hand illusion also provides evidence for plasticity of embodiment, given that 
the rubber hand generally differs in appearance from participants’ own hands. Indeed, visual 
characteristics of the rubber hand, such as skin colour (Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006; Longo 
et al., 2009b) have surprisingly little influence on the illusion. Similarly, participants can easily 
be made to experience embodiment over graphical arms in VR (Slater et al., 2008; Perez-Marcos 
et al., 2009). The rubber hand illusion can even be induced in amputees who have no actual hand 
at all (Ehrsson et al., 2008).  
VR allows especially dramatic manipulations of embodiment, given that virtual worlds 
are not necessarily subject to the usual laws of physics. Recent studies have shown that 
embodiment can be elicited not just over individual parts, but over entire virtual bodies (Slater et 
al., 2009), even bodies radically different from one’s own. Petkova and Ehrsson (2008) attached 
cameras to a mannequin where the eyes would be, and fed the signals to a head mounted display. 
Thus, participants saw the mannequin, in stereo, from a first-person perspective. Synchronous 
touch of the mannequin’s and participant’s torsos produced the illusion that the mannequin’s 
body actually was the participant’s body: a whole-body analogue of the rubber hand illusion. 
Similar illusions were generated by attaching cameras to another person, even of the opposite 
sex, producing an illusion of ‘body swapping’. Thus, participants could experience themselves as 
being inside another person’s body and shaking their own hand. Similarly, Slater and colleagues 
(2010) found that adult male participants could experience ownership over an avatar of a young 
girl. 
 
Limitations on Bodily Plasticity 
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We are intimately familiar with our body. The English idiom “to know something like the 
back of one’s hand” suggests that we have an excellent representation of the actual back of our 
hand! Nevertheless, the preceding results show remarkable lability of bodily awareness. The 
representation of our body flexibly incorporates body parts and even whole bodies very different 
from our own, even when this conflicts dramatically with stored knowledge about our body. 
Such results may give the impression of bodily awareness as infinitely malleable, inconstant, and 
ever-changing. Are there any limits on embodiment? 
In fact, recent results demonstrate that there are limits on embodiment. Both the rubber 
hand illusion (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) and whole-body analogues (Lenggenhager et al., 2007) 
are eliminated when the body is replaced with a non-body object. This suggests that some form 
of ‘body model’ serves as a perceptual filter allowing certain things to become incorporated 
while filtering out others. Interestingly, though, similarity of skin colour between the 
participant’s hand and the rubber hand has no reliable effect (Holmes et al., 2006; Longo et al., 
2009b). This suggests that the body model is relatively generic, consistent with anything that 
looks like a body regardless of whether it looks like my body. While we know what our body is 
like, the limits of bodily awareness appear to be set by a categorical representation of what 
people generally are like. 
Other studies have suggested different limitations on bodily plasticity. Tsakiris, Tajadura-
Jimenez, and Costantini (2011) found reduced susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion in 
participants with high interoceptive awareness on a heartbeat detection task. Analagously, 
Eshkevari and colleagues (in press) found heightened sensitivity to the same illusion in 
individuals with eating disorders, with interoceptive deficts being a highly significant predictor. 
These results suggest that our conscious awareness of the physiological state of our body serves 
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as a limiting factor on body plasticity. Plasticity of body representation may occur when internal 
signals from the body itself are weak, and external, visual evidence about the body therefore 
dominates. 
Finally, a different sort of limit seems to be which class of body representation is 
modified in illusions such as the rubber hand illusion. For example, while the illusion generates 
clear proprioceptive biases when measured perceptually (e.g., Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; 
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005; Longo et al., 2008a), Kammers and colleagues (2009a) found no such 
biases when participants made reaching movements immediately after induction of the rubber 
hand illusion, suggesting that the motor system might resist the illusion. However, this 
dissociation goes away if the induction of the illusion is itself based on viewing one’s own active 
movement (i.e., agency, Tsakiris et al., 2010). In that case, clear effects of the illusion have been 
found on subsequent manual reaction time (Longo & Haggard, 2009) and on pointing (Newport 
et al., 2010). Similarly, Kammers and colleagues (2010) showed that when participants make 
grasping actions following illusion induction, grip aperture is scaled according to the rubber 
hand’s grip aperture. These findings suggest that active motor control can both induce bodily 
illusions, and can also be sensitive to them. 
 
Conclusion 
The experience of having a body is so familiar and so fundamental as to be inexpressible. 
Nevertheless, significant progress has recently been made in developing measures and 
manipulations of bodily awareness. These studies reveal that bodily awareness has measureable 
structure, with distinct and dissociable components, and that the body image shows remarkable 
plasticity, flexibly changing in response to the immediate sensory-motor context. Investigating 
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how this structure and plasticity arise, interact, and develop remain important goals for future 
research, and may contribute to understanding the many psychological conditions in which 
bodily awareness is disturbed. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: A canonical setup to elicit the rubber hand illusion. The participant sees a right rubber 
hand aligned in a similar orientation to their actual unseen right hand. In the ‘Synchronous’ 
condition, the two hands are touched with identical brushes at identical locations at the same 
time. In many participants, this visuo-tactile match generates the compelling feeling that the 
rubber hand really is their hand (i.e., the sense of ownership). In the ‘Asynchronous’ condition, 
in contrast, the two hands are touched at different times, eliminating the multisensory match 
between vision and touch, and abolishing the feeling of ownership over the rubber hand. 
Reprinted from Neuropsychologia, 47(1), M. P. M. Kammers, F. de Vignemont, L. Verhagen, & 
H. C. Dijkerman, ‘The rubber hand illusion in action’, pp. 204-211, 2009, with permission from 
Elsevier. 
 
Figure 2: Examples of participants’ experiences in the ‘Pinocchio illusion’. In both test 
configurations shown here, vibration is applied to the tendon of the biceps muscle (vibrator 
shown as black triangle), generating the proprioceptive illusion that the elbow joint is extending. 
The participant’s hand, however, remains in constant contact with another body part, such as the 
nose (top panel) or the scalp (bottom panel). This creates a sensory conflict, since the only way 
that the moving hand could remain in contact with the other body part is if that body part were 
actually growing. Many participants indeed report feeling like their nose or head is getting 
longer, suggesting that the perceptual conflict is resolved by altering the representation of bodily 
form. Adapted from J. R. Lackner, ‘Some proprioceptive influences on the perceptual 
representation of body shape and orientation’, Brain, 1988, 111(Pt. 2), 281-297, by permission of 
Oxford University Press. 
